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Abstract 
Although user-generated content (UGC) is prevalent these days, high-quality UGC is 
still desired by readers and is crucial for the development of a website. Therefore, how 
to encourage users to produce high-quality content becomes a critical issue for UGC 
platforms. Using travel blogs collected from Lvmama.com, a leading online travel 
agency (OTA) in China, we investigated the effects of money-based incentives on user 
effort to generate high-quality content and its performance in the long run. The launch 
of money-based incentives after several years of running of the platform provides an 
ideal natural experiment setting. We applied the regression discontinuity design, and 
the results show that both user effort and UGC quality increased after the incentive 
program was released. However, the UGC quality declined quickly after that. This 
study concludes by presenting theoretical and managerial implications for both 
research and practice. 
Keywords: UGC quality, money-based incentive, UGC motivation, natural experiment 
 
Introduction 
User-generated content (UGC) is currently playing a vital role in people’s daily lives, especially in 
decision making (Liu, 2006; Zhou and Duan, 2016; Zhu and Zhang, 2010). For UGC websites, the 
quantity and quality of UGC is an assurance to maintain their current users and attract new ones (Goes 
et al., 2016; Liu and Park, 2015). However, UGC such as product reviews and travel blogs is a typical 
type of public good that individuals can use without being required to contribute (Chen et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, the quality of UGC is out of control since it is generated by a large number of users with 
different levels of expertise. Poor-quality UGC is inefficient in providing information for readers and 
leads to the issue of information overload, which presents a barrier for readers to quickly locate the 
useful information. Therefore, how to motivate users to continuously contribute high-quality content 
becomes a critical issue for UGC websites.  
Many UGC websites, such as ecommerce websites, movie-review websites, and online travel agencies 
(OTAs), deploy online incentives to encourage user activities (Zhang et al., 2016). While extant studies 
provided consistent evidence that online incentives exert a positive influence on user effort in 
contributing more content (Cavusoglu et al., 2015; Goes et al., 2016; Hamari, 2017), little attention has 
been paid to UGC quality. The numerous users and the introduction of online incentives result in 
overwhelming UGC. Hence, information searchers (potential consumers) spend increasing time on 
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locating high-quality content to make decisions. Under such circumstances, high-quality content plays 
a key role. Therefore, most UGC websites try to encourage and screen out the high-quality UGC with 
the help of crowds. For instance, they deploy the “like” function that enables readers to praise the high-
quality reviews and utilize money-based incentives to encourage users to exert more effort when writing 
reviews. Our study aims to reveal whether money-based incentives work for improving UGC quality.  
Data from Lvmama.com, a leading OTA in China, were employed in this study. Lvmama.com launched 
a money-based incentive called Travel Treasure to encourage users to contribute high-quality travel 
blogs. In this program, qualified travel blogs recognized by the official website can receive money 
rewards. Because Lvmama.com had run for several years before the launch of this incentive program, 
it provides a natural experiment setting for this study to investigate the effects of this reward program.  
Two main findings were drawn from this study. First, the money-based incentive program increases 
user effort in UGC quality improvement. Second, UGC quality increases at the beginning stage of the 
program but quickly decreases after that. These findings have significant theoretical contributions and 
managerial implications regarding online incentives and user effort intention. 
The rest of this paper begins with an overview of the related literature, which is followed by hypotheses 
development. The data section illustrates the research context and shows model-free evidence. The 
empirical analysis section presents the econometrics analysis. We conclude the paper in the last section 
by revisiting the findings with discussions. 
Literature review 
This study relates to two important and expansive streams of research in the literature: WOM and online 
incentives. First, travel blogs are a kind of UGC and eWOM, and we analyze users’ motivations to 
contribute under a theoretical framework. Second, money-based rewards are a kind of online incentive 
among UGC websites. Hence, we review the literature relevant to online incentives and user effort. 
Motivation to contribute 
Lovett et al. (2013) developed a WOM theoretical framework by summarizing previous studies and 
concluded three major drivers that motivate users to produce WOM. The three major drivers are social, 
functional, and emotional. We thus introduce this WOM theoretical framework to understand users’ 
motivation in online contributions.  
First are social drivers. As Lovett et al. (2013) and Luo et al. (2017) suggested, users have the desire to 
send signals to others about their status, expertise, and uniqueness. eWOM is a fast channel for users to 
show and enhance their expertise level among a large audience. Thereby, users are more likely to engage 
in posting eWOM on products or services that allow for them to gain recognition or reputation from 
peers or the official website (Berger and Heath, 2007; Cheema and Kaikati, 2010). Thus, the social 
driver is salient in explaining users’ motivations to contribute, especially for high-quality content, as 
the number of “helpful votes” or “likes” received from readers can promote users’ statuses and online 
reputation.  
Second are functional drivers. This driver is related to the need to acquire and supply information 
(Anand and Shachar, 2011; Godes and Mayzlin, 2004; Mudambi and Schuff, 2010). The fundamental 
function of WOM is to reduce information asymmetry (Ba and Pavlou, 2002). Among the 
overwhelming number of online reviews, readers (potential consumers) are searching hard for high-
quality reviews to make decisions. During this process, the supply of high-quality content plays a key 
role, and users are more likely to contribute high-quality content in high-involvement product markets 
with superfluous reviews (Peres, Muller, and Mahajan, 2010). To encourage frequent contributions and 
high-quality content, UGC websites usually deploy online incentives.  
Third are emotional drivers. To share one’s positive or negative feelings is a basic attribute of WOM 
(Berger and Milkman, 2012; Nardi et al., 2004; Peters and Kashima, 2007). This driver is particularly 
important in online situations and is driven by consumers’ satisfaction degree for a product or service. 
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As UGC and social media become increasingly important in practice, eWOM, such as product reviews 
and travel blogs, gain significant attention from academia (Yen and Tang, 2015). In addition to the 
above three divers, extant studies have identified the following motives: social benefits (Yoo et al., 
2013), economic incentives (Yoo et al., 2013), self-enhancement (Berger and Iyengar, 2013; Yoo et al., 
2013), the expression of negative feelings (Hennig-Thurau et al., 2004), affiliation and a sense of 
belonging (Chen and Kirmani, 2015; Cheung and Lee, 2012), advice-seeking (Hennig-Thurau et al., 
2004), altruism (Cheung and Lee, 2012), and persuasion (Chen and Kirmani, 2015). 
Online incentives and user effort 
The quantity and quality of user-generated content are crucial in the development of a website, but UGC 
is a public good that users can use for free (Chen et al., 2010). Thereby, encouraging users to contribute 
is a challenge for UGC websites. 
In order to encourage users to frequently contribute blogs or reviews (quantity), UGC websites usually 
deploy incentive hierarchies, through which users can achieve increasingly higher statuses by 
accomplishing progressively difficult tasks (Liu et al. , 2018). In this system, the status of each user can 
be identified according to the uniform ranking system in which users can easily be compared with each 
other with their ranks (Goes et al., 2016). Usually, each badge corresponds to each rank and is 
designated by the website with the explicit criterion. The badges that users obtain are prominently 
displayed on their public profiles and can be viewed by their peers, which serve as symbols of users’ 
statuses in a community (Anderson et al., 2015). A higher status represents greater glory, authority, and 
influence among peers (Anderson et al., 2015; Sailer et al., 2017).  
Extant studies from several research fields confirmed the positive effects of online incentives on user 
effort (Cavusoglu et al., 2015; Goes et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016). As Hamari (2017) stated, glory-based 
badges that represent statuses place participants in a gamified environment and increase their 
engagement intention. For instance, Goes et al. (2016) analyzed a dataset of online Q&A users and 
indicated that although glory-based incentives motivate users to contribute more, their contributory 
effort drops significantly after the statuses are obtained. Similarly, Liu et al. (2016) observed that the 
positive effect of glory-based badges is temporary and decreases with time using a dataset of online 
travel agency users. Cavusoglu et al. (2015) empirically examined the extent to which participants are 
motivated by earned badges and revealed a positive effect of badges on voluntary participation. Liu et 
al. (2018) revealed that users are more eager for the quick upgrade of their statuses when at a lower 
status.  
However, as Anderson et al. (2013) discussed, although online incentives such as badges motivate users 
to increase their activities, it brings up the question regarding how these incentives affect the quality of 
their contributions. To encourage users to contribute high-quality content (quality), several incentives 
are usually adopted in practice: “helpful votes”, “likes”, and “expert reviews”. Helpful votes or likes 
are recognition from peers (Baek et al., 2012; Fang et al., 2016). Kwok and Xie (2016) showed that the 
number of helpful votes that a review receives can be affected by the poster’s status and other 
characteristics. Fang et al. (2016) found that the perceived value of online reviews (represented by 
helpful votes) is correlated with text readability and reviewer characteristics. An expert review is 
recognition from the official website, which can be more powerful than peer recognition in encouraging 
users to contribute high-quality content (Zhang et al., 2016). The extant studies mainly explored the 
influence of glory-based incentives (badge ranks) on user effort, but there is a lack of studies that 
investigate the influence of money-based incentives on user effort and UGC quality. We thus aim to fill 
this research gap and examine the efficiency of money-based incentives on encouraging user activities 
and UGC quality. 
Hypotheses development 
Since online incentives might influence user effort, which will ultimately affect the quality of UGC, 
hypotheses are developed for both user effort and UGC quality. 
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Goals and user effort 
Rewards earned from online contributions are a powerful motivator within a community (Anderson and 
Brown, 2010; Anderson et al., 2015). Research has shown that individuals are motivated to approach 
rewards or goals (Elliot, 2006; Hull, 1932), and the motivation to achieve them intensifies as they are 
approaching (Kivetz et al., 2006; Wadhwa and Kim, 2015).  
As the rewards program is issued, users are encouraged and motivated to achieve each reward. The 
pursuit of rewards can serve as goals and lead to goal-directed online behaviors (Cheema and Bagchi, 
2011). According to Goal-setting Theory, participant effort will change before and after goal-seeking 
(Koo and Fishbach, 2008). Within a money-based incentive environment (after the rewards program is 
issued), users work hard to obtain each award. The desire for such rewards induces users to exert more 
effort on their blogs than before the rewards program was issued. 
According to Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Mcdermott et al., 2008; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992), rewards act as the reference point for users who post travel blogs after the rewards 
program was issued. Wang et al. (2017) revealed that the effort paid to a task can reinforce the 
evaluation and the subjective expectation of its performance. Accordingly, the more effort that a user 
exerted in writing a travel blog, the higher expectation he or she has on the blog, which thereby 
reinforces the user’s expectation of achieving the award (Brehm and Self, 1989; Wang et al., 2017). 
Therefore, users are more motivated to contribute after the rewards program was issued compared to 
before when there are no incentives. Accordingly, we hypothesize the following: 
H1: User effort on the platform increases after the release of a money-based incentive program. 
Official recognition and UGC quality 
Sharing one’s experiences in an online community is largely a public good due to its positive 
externalities (Chen et al., 2010; Goes et al., 2016). For UGC websites, the key to resolving this public 
good problem and encouraging user contributions is to offer rewards through which users can 
internalize certain benefits of their contributions and fulfill their self-fulfillment demand (Hennig-
Thurau et al., 2004). Different from most UGC websites, Lvmama offers money-based rewards.  
Before the rewards program was issued, users were less motivated to improve the quality of their blogs 
due to the lack of efficient incentives. In this situation, high-quality blogs and poor-quality blogs are 
indifferent, both of which cannot earn rewards. Therefore, users’ efforts and intentions to improve the 
quality of their contributions are weak. However, after the reward policy issues, earning the rewards 
can act as goals and lead to goal-directed behaviors. Users are motivated to try their best to earn the 
rewards, especially for the money-based rewards. According to the rewards policy, users can earn 
money from posting travel blogs only if their blogs are officially recognized as “recommendations” and 
“beautiful/helpful”. As a result, a poor-quality blog requires less effort and has a low probability to earn 
a reward, while a high-quality blog needs more effort and has a high probability to earn a reward. To 
increase the probability of being recognized as a “recommendation” and “beautiful/helpful”, users need 
to ensure or improve the quality of their blogs. Therefore, exerting more effort to generate high quality 
blogs becomes a better choice. As a result, the quality of UGC on the platform will increase. We thus 
propose the following: 
H2: The UGC quality on the platform improves after the release of the money-based incentive program. 
Data and model-free evidence 
Research context  
Lvmama.com is one of the leading OTAs in China, and it created a blog section for users to share their 
travel experiences approximately 2013. In September 2014, the company launched a money-based 
incentive program named Travel Treasure to encourage users to contribute more high-quality content. 
The first season of this program was concluded at the end of 2014, and the second season was launched 
in May 2015. On May 5th, 2015, an announcement of the second season of Travel Treasure was 
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released. The announcement stated that users could receive reward points equal to 100 RMB for each 
qualified blog published between May 10th, 2015, and December 31st, 2015. The points can be applied 
to purchase any travel products (e.g., air tickets, hotels, tour packages, etc.) on Lvmama.com without 
any limitation except encashment. It means that the coupon can be similar to the role of cash. To be a 
qualified blog, the blog must include the label “I am an expert” in the title and should be officially 
recognized as a “recommendation” and “beautiful / helpful”. “Recommendation” means that this blog 
is thought to be of high quality, “helpful” represents that this blog provides some useful tips for readers, 
and “beautiful” indicates that this blog provides enough beautiful photos. 
Data collection and variables  
Data collection was conducted on January 15th, 2018, and all historical travel blogs were retrieved. 
This study only uses the information of travel blogs posted in 2015 for two reasons. First, the first 
season only lasted for about three months, while the second season lasted for approximately 8 months. 
The longer period enables us to perform deeper analysis. Second, although Lvmama also launched the 
third season and fourth season, there are rarely gaps between seasons. The third season began on January 
5th, 2016, and ended on December 31st, 2016. The fourth season began on January 1st, 2017, and ended 
on December 31st, 2017 Therefore, the year of 2015 that contains 4 months with no rewards program 
period and 8 months of the rewards program running period becomes the best period for this study to 
investigate the effect of this rewards program on the platform.  
Moreover, 6,048 travel blogs were published in 2015. The data include the blog title, blog content, 
posting date, author, recommendation label, helpful label, beautiful label, number of views, number of 
likes, tour departure date (if reported), tour return date (if reported), etc. 
User effort in writing blogs is measured by the text length (TL), which is the number of words in the 
blog. Text length is the most intuitive measurement of effort since longer text certainly takes more effort 
(Godes and Silva, 2012; Liu et al., 2018). The number of photos (Photo) uploaded in the blog is 
introduced as another measurement of user effort. Although uploading more photos also takes more 
effort due to the photo selection and photo arrangement, it obviously takes less effort than writing words. 
We thus use it for the robustness check. 
Table 1. Summary statistics of interested variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TL 6,048 5.300 5.7516 0 32.767 
LPV 6,048 1.637 12.9022 0 654.909 
Photo 6,048 59.502 75.8077 0 1,186 
 
Since it is difficult to directly measure the quality of blogs, this study employes the number of likes per 
thousand views (LPV) to measure the quality. The “likes” function is a kind of usefulness/helpfulness 
voting system. A like means that a reader was attracted by the blog and praised it, which indicates that 
this blog is helpful to him/her. Therefore, the number of likes can serve as a valid proxy for blog quality. 
Since the number of likes is correlated with the quality and the time elapsed since the blog was published, 
we used the number of likes per thousand views (LPV) in this study. Table 1 provides the summary 
statistics of the variables of interest, where TL is measured in thousands. 
Identification strategy  
The main purpose of this study is to explore the effect of launching a rewards program on user efforts 
in generating high-quality content. Since all users on the platform can join this rewards program to earn 
money by writing high-quality blogs, all of them were treated as individuals, which means that all users 
were supposed to change their behavioral patterns immediately after the shock of the rewards program. 
As a result, the regression discontinuity design (RDD) becomes an ideal method to identify the impacts 
of launching such a rewards program on user activities. Moreover, it is obviously a sharp RDD. 
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The running variable in RDD in this study is time. The announcement date of the rewards program 
(May 5th, 2015) is selected as the cutoff. To the best of our knowledge, there were no other events that 
happened in 2015 that might influence user activities. Thereby, the results will not be influenced by 
other exogenous shocks and users were not able to know the release date of this program in advance. 
We use the announcement date rather than the effective date (May 10th, 2015) of the rewards program 
for two reasons. First, blogs should be officially evaluated to decide whether they are qualified, and the 
review process takes approximately 7 days. Therefore, users tend to take part in the program earlier 
than the effective date. Second, using the announcement date of policies, earnings, and other events is 
a common practice, especially in the decision-making behaviors such as investor reactions and 
information demand (Dellavigna and Pollet, 2009; Drake et al., 2012). In addition, we perform 
additional tests using the cutoff of May 10th, 2015, and the results support our selection. 
Model-free evidence  
We first provide some model-free evidence by drawing regression discontinuity plots. Two critical 
issues in RDD can lead to a biased estimation: bandwidth choice and the order of the polynomial. 
Although there are several algorithms to calculate the optimal bandwidth, it is better to provide more 
results with different bandwidth choices for robustness. Hence, four different bandwidths are selected 
in this study: 30, 60, 90, and 120. In addition, we also perform the MSE-optimal bandwidth choice and 
CER-optimal bandwidth choice with several kernels, and the results are within the range of these four 
bandwidths. We also provide results up to the fourth-order polynomial. 
Figure 1. Mean text length against time 
with bandwidth = 30 
Figure 2. Mean text length against time 
with bandwidth = 60 
Figure 3. Mean text length against time 
with bandwidth = 90 
Figure 4. Mean text length against time 
with bandwidth = 120 
The plots of mean text length against time with fitted curves are shown in Figures 1-4, where Distance 
represents the number of days to the cutoff day (May 5th, 2015). All 16 plots in these four figures show 
a clear positive jump at the cutoff, thus indicating that the release of the rewards program did increase 
user efforts on the platform. 
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Figures 5-8 present the plots of the mean LPV against time with fitted curves. Most of these plots show 
a clear positive jump at the cutoff except the plots in Figure 8, which reports the plots with a bandwidth 
of 120. It is reasonable that this bandwidth might be too large for RDD to estimate. The effect might 
decrease along with time, or the effect might be influenced by some unobserved random events. In fact, 
neither of the two optimal bandwidth choice algorithms suggests a large bandwidth for LPV (the largest 
one is approximately 60). Therefore, the plots suggest that the release of the rewards program increases 
the quality of the travel blogs on the platform. 
Figure 5. Mean LPV against time with 
bandwidth = 30 
Figure 6. Mean LPV against time with 
bandwidth = 60 
 
Figure 7. Mean LPV against time with 
bandwidth = 90 
Figure 8. Mean LPV against time with 
bandwidth = 120 
Empirical analysis 
Econometrics model 
The model-free evidence shows a significant effect of the rewards program. We thereby designed a 
regression discontinuity model to empirically investigate this effect further. The econometrics model is 
as follows (equation (1)). 
ݕ௜ ൌ 	ߚ଴1ሺܴ݈݁݁ܽݏ݁௜ሻ ൅ 	1ሺܴ݈݁݁ܽݏ݁௜ሻ෍ߚଵ,௣ሺ|ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜|ሻ௣
௣̅
௣ୀଵ
൅ 
൫1 െ 1ሺܴ݈݁݁ܽݏ݁௜ሻ൯∑ ߚଶ,௣ሺ|ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜|ሻ௣௣̅௣ୀଵ ൅ ܆࢏ࢽ ൅ ߝ௜                       (1) 
In model (1), the dependent variable ݕ௜ represents the three interested variables of blog i: TL, LPV, and 
Photo. 1ሺܴ݈݁݁ܽݏ݁௜ሻ is a dummy variable indicating whether blog i is posted after the cutoff day (1 for after, 0 for before). ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜ represents the days from when blog i was posted to the cutoff day, and 
∑ ߚଵ,௣ሺ|ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜|ሻ௣௣̅௣ୀଵ  is a ݌̅-order polynomial of Distance. ܆࢏ is a set of control variables, while ε_i 
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is the random error. The individual fixed effect is not included in this model since this study aims to 
investigate the performance of the rewards program on the platform, namely, the change of user efforts 
and UGC quality before and after the lunching of the rewards program. The effects of the rewards 
program on the individual level are beyond this study. 
Results 
For the dependent variable of text length (TL), two control variables are included. One is the total days 
of the whole tour. The more days that a tourist spent on a tour, the more things that he/she can do, and 
thereby, they can write more when posting travel blogs. The other is the number of days that elapsed 
from the return date of a tour and the blogging date since it is more difficult to recall things that 
happened a longer time ago.  
The weighted least squares method is applied to estimate the model, and the weight is the inverse of the 
absolute distance. Up to the second-order polynomial is estimated in this study (Goes et al., 2016; Nunes 
and Drèze 2006) since high-order polynomials could be misleading (Gelman and Imbens 2014). We 
run 8 regressions (four different bandwidth × two different orders), and the results are reported in Table 
2. Only ߚ଴ is reported for clarify since we mainly focus on the instantaneous effect of the rewards program. 
Table 2. Results for text length 
Bandwidth 30 60 90 120 
Order = 1 1.980(0.532)*** 1.737(0.465)*** 1.425(0.427)*** 1.421(0.401)***
Order = 2 2.107(0.655)*** 2.132(0.563)*** 2.106(0.514)*** 1.790(0.487)***
# of obs. (Left) 359 693 918 1,167 
# of obs. (Right) 425 870 1,356 1,956 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses 
As reported in Table 2, the ߚ଴ݏ are significantly positive in all eight models. This result indicates that the release of the money-based incentive program significantly increases user effort in writing blogs on 
the platform. In particular, the average increment of the text length per blog is approximately 2,000 
words after the reward program was released. As the average text length for blogs posted in 2015 is 
approximately 5,300 words, this increment is quite magnificent. Thus, H1 is supported.  
For the dependent variable of LPV, we also introduce two control variables: TL and Photo. Blogs with 
more words and more photos may contain more information about the tour, and thereby, they have a 
higher probability to provide the reader with more useful information. As a result, these blogs would 
receive more likes from the readers. We also run 8 regressions with WLS, and the results are reported 
in Table 3. 
Table 3. Results for LPV 
Bandwidth 30 60 90 120 
Order = 1 0.802(0.308)*** 0.725(0.261)*** 0.700(0.249)*** 1.813(0.386)***
Order = 2 0.670(0.421) 0.837(0.332)** 0.807(0.299)*** -0.521(0.512) 
# of obs. (Left) 362 697 923 1174 
# of obs. (Right) 425 872 1359 1961 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
As shown in Table 3, the ߚ଴ݏ  are significantly positive in most of the results, most of which are approximately 0.8 except for the one in the model with the 120 bandwidth and the first-order polynomial. 
Since the mean of the LPV is 3.489, an increment of 0.8 represents a magnificent effect. Thereby, our 
H2 investigating the positive effect of the rewards program on UGC quality on the platform is generally 
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supported. However, the instantaneous effect of the rewards program on UGC quality will decrease 
over time according to the plots (Figure 5-8). One possible explanation is that users did not know the 
standard of being qualified blogs at the beginning, and hence, they tried their best to meet the 
requirements and increase the probability. After a period, users were able to learn the standard by 
reading the qualified blogs or from their successful experiences and adjust the level of effort to 
maximize profits. They may find that a longer text will have a higher probability to receive certification, 
while a higher-quality text will not. Therefore, the optimal strategy is writing longer text to win the 
rewards. Since the decrement of LPV does not influence the chance of winning rewards, the users do 
not care about it. 
Robustness check 
To further validate the robustness of our main results, we perform the following two robustness checks. 
We first apply the higher-order polynomial in the regression discontinuity model. To ensure there are 
enough observations to be estimated, we do not run regressions for the bandwidth of 30. The results are 
reported in Tables 4-5, which are consistent with our main results. 
Table 4. Results for text length with higher-order polynomial 
Bandwidth 60 90 120 
Order = 3 2.046(0.639)*** 2.045(0.590)*** 2.224(0.556)*** 
Order = 4 2.024(0.670)*** 1.970(0.612)*** 2.117(0.580)*** 
# of obs. (Left) 693 918 1,167 
# of obs. (Right) 870 1,356 1,956 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
Table 5. Results for LPV with higher-order polynomial 
Bandwidth 60 90 120 
Order = 3 0.906(0.401)** 0.932(0.363)** 1.588(0.447)*** 
Order = 4 0.902(0.450)** 0.925(0.399)** 1.651(0.472)*** 
# of obs. (Left) 697 923 1,174 
# of obs. (Right) 872 1,359 1,961 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
We then replace the text length with the number of photos in the blog. Uploading photos and arranging 
them also takes effort, although it may be less than writing words. Therefore, we perform all analyses 
using the number of photos as the dependent variable, including plots and regressions. The results are 
not reported due to the page limit, and they are consistent with the results obtained from using the text 
length. Thereby, our hypotheses are again supported. 
We also replace the announcement date with the effective date as the cutoff. Neither the plots nor the 
regression discontinuity results show a significant instantaneous effect (the results are not reported due 
to the page limit). This result provides evidence to support our selection of the cutoff. 
Conclusions 
Using a dataset collected from a leading travel platform in China and applying the regression 
discontinuity design, our study reveals the positive effects of money-based incentives on user efforts 
and UGC quality. First, user efforts as represented by the text length increase after the rewards program 
was released and lead to an almost 40% instantaneous increment. Second, the quality of UGC increases 
at the beginning of the rewards program and declines over time.  
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This study represents one of the first attempts to investigate the effect of money-based incentives on the 
quality of UGC, while prior studies mainly focus on the effect of glory-based incentives on the quantity 
of UGC (Cavusoglu et al., 2015; Goes et al., 2016; Hamari, 2017). Unlike the glory-based incentives, 
the money-based incentives involve money. In the Maslow's hierarchy of needs, the money is more like 
the lower level of physiological needs, whereas the glory is more like the higher level of needs such as 
self-actualization. Therefore, it is obviously that the money reward could attract more people than the 
glory reward since there are more individuals having the physiological needs. Our results show users 
are strategic in the money-based incentives. They pretend to take more effort by writing more words 
and posting more photos to earn money, but the true quality measured by the number of likes does 
increase in long term. Another theoretical contribution to the literature of this study is the effort is 
measured by the quality, whereas extant literature mainly pay attention to the quantity of UGC 
(Cavusoglu et al., 2015; Goes et al., 2016; Hamari, 2017). For example, users’ effort in Goes et al. 
(2016)’s work is measured by the number of questions answered. In fact, the quality is more important 
than the quantity since all people need high quality information but not many low quality information. 
Therefore, it is more important to understand why do users contribute high quality UGC. This study 
shed a light on the future investigation on the UGC motivation. 
Our results yield direct implications for UGC platforms to encourage users to generate more high-
quality content. First, the powerful effect of money-based incentives results in a 40% increment in text 
length on the platform, which largely increases the reading load of information searchers. Therefore, 
we suggest that the platform set a maximum number of words for each blog. The length limit will 
encourage the users to take more effort to improve the quality instead of merely including more 
information. Additionally, the platform should consider more about the content quality rather than the 
length when officially recognizing qualified blogs. Second, the positive jump of UGC quality after the 
rewards program release suggests that the rewards program does have a positive effect on UGC quality. 
However, the quick decline indicates that the incentive does not last long. One possible explanation is 
that users might learn from experience and minimize their effort levels. Hence, the platform should 
design a better incentive system to encourage user activities over the long run. For example, only the 
users that were in the top 10% of likes can get the rewards.  
This study has several limitations. First, UGC quality is represented only by the like ratio, and user 
effort is measured only by the text length and the number of photos. More measurements should be 
introduced to investigate deeper, such as readability, sentiment, etc. Second, an author-specific fixed 
effect is not included in this study. Unobservable author specific heterogeneity might have an impact 
on both user efforts and UGC quality. Although we only focus on the change of user activities on the 
platform before and after the rewards program was released, the inclusion of a user-specific fixed effect 
would enable us to better understand the underlying reasons of efforts and quality increments. Third, 
the reason why UGC quality declines quickly is not further explored in this study, which can be an 
interesting future direction. 
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